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he number of banks in the United States fell
from about 14,500 in the early 1980s to
about 11,000 a decade later, and the average
bank asset size rose by about 40 percent in
inﬂation-adjusted terms. This trend toward fewer, larger
banks raises an interesting question: How does the size of a
banking company affect the amount and type of risk it
takes? The answer is important for policymakers concerned
with banking system risk.
This article investigates the relationship
between asset size and risk at bank holding companies
from 1987 to 1993.1 We ﬁnd that for most of this
period, the level of risk at large bank holding companies
did not differ signiﬁcantly from that at small bank
holding companies. However, we do ﬁnd some signiﬁ-
cant differences in the nature of that risk. Although the
advantage of size has allowed larger institutions to
diversify their risk, differences in activities and leverage
have counterbalanced this diversiﬁcation advantage,
leaving large bank holding companies with no less risk
than small companies throughout most of the period
that we examine.
Since 1991, however, a different pattern has begun
to emerge. The lending patterns and off-balance-sheet
activities of large and small bank holding companies have
evolved and, most important, differences in the leverage of
large and small companies have declined signiﬁcantly.
Consequently, the diversiﬁcation advantage of size has
become apparent, and we have begun to observe an inverse
relationship between size and risk.
We suggest that the recent reduction in risk at
large bank holding companies relative to small companies
may stem from the regulatory reforms of the early 1990s.
Implementation of risk-based capital requirements has
most strongly affected banking companies that have had
low capital ratios and have engaged heavily in risky lend-
ing and off-balance-sheet activities, characteristics gener-
ally associated with large banking companies. Moreover,
the largest banking companies may now face additional
pressure to reduce risk as a result of the Federal Deposit
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Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, which strength-
ens market discipline by directing regulators to back away
from a “too-big-to-fail” policy.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SIZE AND RISK
We use information on the stock returns of publicly traded
bank holding companies to measure their risk. In particu-
lar, our analysis is based on “equity risk,” deﬁned as the
degree to which a bank holding company’s weekly stock
return ﬂuctuates over a one-year period. Equity risk is a
summary measure associated with the holding company as
a whole—that is, it captures risk stemming from all of the
holding company’s subsidiaries and reﬂects diversiﬁcation
across them.
This approach has many advantages, but also some
drawbacks—mainly that it limits our analysis to those
bank holding companies that have publicly traded equity.
The main advantage of our approach is that it provides a
forward-looking measure of risk, since stock market valua-
tions reﬂect the expectations of market participants (such
as analysts and investors) regarding the future proﬁtability
of banking institutions. A second advantage is that it facil-
itates measurement of both risk and diversiﬁcation using a
single methodology, described below.
A RISK DECOMPOSITION
Our analysis draws upon two underlying principles of port-
folio theory: (1) diversiﬁcation reduces risk and (2) the
potential for diversiﬁcation increases with the size of a
portfolio. We apply these principles to the banking insti-
tution. In particular, if a large bank holding company is
nothing more than a scaled-up version of a small bank
holding company, then we should expect large companies
to exhibit lower risk because of the beneﬁts of diversiﬁca-
tion. Both small and large bank holding companies engage
in loan origination and loan funding, with large companies
generally having access to a broader deposit base and a
wider variety of borrowers. Portfolio theory would suggest
that this diversiﬁcation potential works to reduce the risk
of large bank holding companies.2 If, however, there are
fundamental differences in the nature of the assets, liabili-
ties, and off-balance-sheet positions of large and small
bank holding companies, then large companies might not
exhibit lower risk than small companies.
In our analysis, we divide equity risk into two
components and calculate the relationship between asset
size and each risk component. The ﬁrst risk component,
systematic risk, measures equity return variability related to
underlying economic conditions affecting the banking
industry as a whole. The remaining variability in stock
returns, ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, measures equity return variability
unique to each company. Each component is derived by
measuring the extent to which a given company’s stock
return tracks the stock returns of a large sample of bank
holding companies (see appendix).3
This risk decomposition provides a convenient
way to measure the role of diversiﬁcation in explaining the
relationship between size and risk at bank holding compa-
nies. Because the poorly diversiﬁed banking company is
subject to shocks stemming from industrial, regional, or
other types of asset or liability concentrations, it is likely to
display a large amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk—risk that a
well-diversiﬁed company is much more likely to avoid.
Diversiﬁcation cannot help the well-diversiﬁed company
eliminate systematic risk, however, since this risk is related
to broad underlying economic conditions affecting the
banking industry as a whole.
Consider a hypothetical example: Suppose two
bank holding companies have similar levels of total equity
risk, but the ﬁrst company’s risk is predominately ﬁrm-
speciﬁc.4 We would conclude that the ﬁrst company is less
diversiﬁed than the second. We would also conclude that if
Systematic risk measures equity return
variability related to underlying economic
conditions. . . . Firm-speciﬁc risk measures
equity return variability unique to
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the ﬁrst company were to increase its diversiﬁcation (for
example, by expanding the scope of its lending to new
industries or regions of the country), then its ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk would decrease. With no concurrent increase in sys-
tematic risk, the overall equity risk of the company would
decrease by the same amount.
Using the same reasoning, we make the following
claim: If large bank holding companies are simply scaled-
up, better diversiﬁed versions of small bank holding com-
panies, then the greater a company’s size, the lower its
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. Since diversiﬁcation reduces only ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk, however, we should observe no relationship
between size and systematic risk. As in our hypothetical
example, the end result would be an inverse relationship
between size and total equity risk.
Of course, if large bank holding companies are not
simply scaled-up versions of small companies, these rela-
tionships may not hold. For instance, if large companies
pursue riskier activities, we may observe a positive rela-
tionship between size and either of the two components of
equity risk, even if large bank holding companies are more
diversiﬁed. The relationship between size and total equity
risk would then be ambiguous.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We now turn to empirical evidence to determine which of
these two characterizations is more accurate. That is, can large
bank holding companies be characterized simply as scaled-
up, better diversiﬁed versions of small companies, or are there
fundamental differences between the assets, liabilities, and
off-balance-sheet positions of large and small institutions?
Our answer is based on an analysis of approxi-
mately 100 bank holding companies.5 We measure holding
company size using total assets. Since we must restrict our
attention to publicly traded companies, our sample asset
size distribution is not representative of all bank holding
companies, but it does provide ample variation. For
instance, the asset sizes in our sample in 1993 ranged from
$340 million to $214 billion, with a median of $10 bil-
lion. Taken as a group, the companies in our original sam-
ple held a little less than half of all commercial banking
assets in the United States in 1993.
Using data from 1987 to 1993, Chart 1 illustrates
the empirical relationships between size and each of the
two components of equity risk.6 Once asset size exceeds
$5 billion, we observe a positive relationship between asset
size and systematic risk. Firm-speciﬁc risk is highest for
the smallest size group but otherwise bears little relation-
ship to size. Note that the mix between systematic and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk at large bank holding companies (those
with assets of more than $25 billion) is very different from
the mix at small companies (those with assets of less than
$5 billion). In particular, ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk makes a bigger
contribution to total equity risk at small companies than at
large ones. (That contribution falls from 73 percent to
53 percent as asset size increases.)
By combining the two components of risk,
Chart 2 shows how total equity risk varies with holding
Firm-speciﬁc risk makes a bigger contribution to
total equity risk at small companies.
Relationship between Bank Holding Company Size￿
and Risk Components, 1987-93
Chart 1
Percent
Less than $5 $5-$10 $10-$25 Greater than $25
Source:  Author￿ s’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in￿
Security Prices and the consolidated financial statements of a sample of ￿
publicly traded bank holding companies.
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company size. We see little discernible relationship
between asset size and total equity risk.
The patterns illustrated in these charts provide
empirical support for the idea that size enhances diversiﬁ-
cation, since ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk makes a smaller contribu-
tion to total equity risk at large bank holding companies.
However, size also appears to lead to an increased appetite
for certain risky activities: systematic risk (unaffected by
diversiﬁcation) increases by 70 percent as we move from
companies with $5 billion to $10 billion in assets to those
with more than $25 billion. The different activities of
small and large bank holding companies may also affect
how ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk varies with size, masking the nega-
tive relationship that we would expect to see if large bank
holding companies were simply scaled-up, better diversi-
ﬁed versions of small companies.
RISKY BUSINESS: HOW PORTFOLIOS DIFFER
Fundamental disparities in the portfolios of small and large
bank holding companies are indeed important in under-
standing the differences in their risk characteristics.
Throughout most of the period that we examine, large
companies were more likely to engage in certain risky
activities, such as commercial and industrial lending. At
the same time, small companies were more likely to be
involved in the relatively safe activities of home mortgage
and consumer lending.7
These portfolio differences are presented in Table 1.
Using data from 1987, we contrast certain key balance-
sheet characteristics and off-balance-sheet positions for a
typical small and a typical large bank holding company in
our sample. (Typical small company characteristics are
deﬁned as the median characteristics for the sample of
companies with less than $5 billion in assets. Typical
large company characteristics are deﬁned as the median
Source: Consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly traded bank
holding companies.
Notes: Table presents the median portfolio attributes from 1987 for two subsets
of our sample of publicly traded bank holding companies. The ﬁrst column pre-
sents median portfolio attributes for holding companies with less than $5 billion
in assets; the median size of the small holding companies is $3.6 billion. The sec-
ond column presents median portfolio attributes for holding companies with
more than $25 billion in assets; the median size of the large holding companies is
$50 billion.
a The loan concentration index equals the sum of the squared shares of each of the
bank holding company’s loan types (commercial and industrial, real estate, agri-
cultural, consumer, and other) as a fraction of total loans. Higher values of the
index indicate more concentrated lending.
b Interest rate swaps and foreign exchange futures are based on notional principal
amounts.
c This variable equals 1 for holding companies with commercial bank subsidiaries
operating in more than one census region and zero otherwise.
Table 1











Commercial and industrial loans/assets 18.74 23.70
Real estate loans/assets 20.57 16.09
Agricultural loans/assets 0.24 0.23
Consumer loans/assets 12.98 10.32
Loan concentration indexa 29.36 28.89
Trading assets/assets 0.05 2.53
Deposits/assets 78.18 64.28
Noninterest deposits/assets 24.67 24.76
Foreign deposits/assets 0.04 21.21
Equity capital/assets 6.43 5.15
Interest rate swaps/assetsb 0.00 19.20
Foreign exchange futures/assetsb 0.00 28.72
Noninterest income/net interest income 54.17 86.24
Multiple census indicatorc 0 1
Relationship between Bank Holding Company Size￿
and Total Risk, 1987-93
Chart 2
Percent
Less than $5 $5-$10 $10-$25 Greater than $25
(44 companies) (33 companies) (29 companies) (24 companies)
Source:  Author￿ s’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in￿
Security Prices and the consolidated financial statements of a sample of ￿
publicly traded bank holding companies.￿
Note:  Each bar indicates the average level of total risk (systematic risk plus￿
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characteristics for the sample of companies with more
than $25 billion in assets.)
Of particular interest are differences in lending
behavior, capital ratios, and geographical diversiﬁcation.
For example, the typical large company was far more likely
to diversify geographically by operating commercial bank-
ing subsidiaries in more than one census region or by
accepting foreign deposits. At the same time, the large
bank holding company also engaged in more commercial
and industrial lending and less consumer lending and oper-
ated with a smaller capital ratio.8 (Higher leverage—that
is, a smaller capital-to-assets ratio—increases equity risk
because changes in asset values at highly leveraged ﬁrms
have a larger impact on equity value.) Finally, large bank
holding companies were more likely to hold assets in their
trading accounts, were more likely to participate in deriva-
tives markets, and generated a larger percentage of income
from noninterest revenues.
For our purposes, these portfolio differences are
interesting primarily because of their effects on each of the
two components of equity risk. The strength of these effects
is demonstrated in Table 2, which illustrates how risk
changes as we move from the portfolio attributes of the typ-
ical small bank holding company to those of the typical
large company.9 For instance, changing from the capital-to-
assets ratio of the small bank holding company to that of
the large company leads to a 12 percent increase in system-
atic risk and a 20 percent increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk.
Changing from the ratio of commercial and industrial loans
to assets of the small bank holding company to that of the
typical large company leads to a 13 percent increase in sys-
tematic risk and a 12 percent increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk.
Some of the other portfolio characteristics described
in Tables 1 and 2 tend to reduce the risks of large bank
holding companies. For instance, changing from the geo-
graphical diversiﬁcation of commercial bank subsidiaries at
the typical small bank holding company to that at the typ-
ical large company is associated with a 21 percent decrease
in systematic risk and a 26 percent decrease in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk.10
We gauge the collective importance of the port-
folio characteristics in Table 2 by quantifying the rela-
tionship between size and risk while holding portfolio
characteristics constant. By comparing this “conditional” rela-
tionship between size and risk with the “unconditional”
relationship between the same two variables, we can illus-
trate just how important fundamental differences in the
portfolio attributes of large and small bank holding com-
panies are in explaining differences in their risk proﬁles.
Ideally, we would quantify the conditional relationship by
identifying a sample of bank holding companies of differ-
ent sizes with similar portfolio attributes and observing
how their risk characteristics differ. Since this experiment
is not possible, we instead use regressions to quantify the
conditional relationship between size and risk. We esti-
mate two regressions relating systematic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk to asset size and the portfolio characteristics described
in Table 2.11
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices and the consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly
traded bank holding companies.
Notes: Table presents the effect on systematic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk of changing
from the portfolio attributes of the typical small holding company to those of the
typical large holding company. The difference between large-company and small-
company values for each portfolio attribute is multiplied by a regression coefﬁ-
cient estimated by relating the log of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk or the log of systematic
risk to the set of portfolio attributes shown in Table 1. Each regression also
includes a measure of each holding company’s stock liquidity as an explanatory
variable. See Demsetz and Strahan (1995) for a detailed description of the
regression model.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 2
HOW PORTFOLIO ATTRIBUTES OF LARGE AND SMALL BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES AFFECT RISK
Percent Change in Risk When








Commercial and industrial loans/assets 12.60* 11.59*
Real estate loans/assets -4.67* -3.39*
Agricultural loans/assets -0.02* -0.21*
Consumer loans/assets -1.39* 0.51*
Loan concentration index -0.65* -0.85*
Trading assets/assets -0.03* -3.18*
Deposits/assets 1.00* 5.20*
Noninterest deposits/assets 0.04* -0.04*
Foreign deposits/assets -10.80* -7.79*
Equity capital/assets 12.40* 20.33*
Interest rate swaps/assets -0.56* 0.83*
Foreign exchange futures/assets 4.88* 1.81*
Noninterest income/net interest income 0.29* 0.51*
Multiple census indicator -21.20* -26.00*18 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
The key results from our regression analysis appear
in Table 3. Once we control for portfolio characteristics,
the relationship between size and systematic risk becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, the
negative relationship between size and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
strengthens, implying that a 10 percent increase in total
assets would lead to a 2.5 percent reduction in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk, provided that this increase in assets was not accompa-
nied by an increase in risk-enhancing activities. The relation-
ships between size and the two components of equity risk are
now consistent with the predictions of portfolio theory.
Why do we observe such important differences in
the relationship between size and risk before and after con-
trolling for portfolio characteristics? Consider commercial
and industrial lending, which is (1) pursued more aggres-
sively by large bank holding companies, as shown in Table 1,
and (2) positively related to both systematic and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk, as shown in Table 2. If we attempted to mea-
sure the relationship between size and systematic or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk without controlling for this type of lending, we
would actually measure a combination of two effects: the
effect of size on risk and the effect of commercial and indus-
trial lending on risk. We would therefore exaggerate the true
effect of size on each risk component because of the strong
positive relationships between commercial and industrial
lending and holding company size and between commercial
and industrial lending and holding company risk.
Omitting portfolio characteristics inversely related
to size and directly related to risk (or vice versa) from the
analysis would lead us to understate the true size/risk rela-
tionship. Overall, the commercial and industrial lending
example typiﬁes the norm. Whether we focus our attention
on systematic risk or ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, we ﬁnd that the
conditional relationship between size and risk is smaller
than the unconditional relationship. According to the con-
ditional relationship, size reduces ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk but, as
expected, has little effect on systematic risk.12
WHY DO LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
HOLD RISKIER PORTFOLIOS?
Although large bank holding companies have beneﬁted
from risk-reducing diversiﬁcation, on average they have
still taken on greater risk than small companies. This raises
the question: Why have large bank holding companies
chosen to counterbalance their diversiﬁcation advantage by
pursuing certain risk-enhancing activities and operating
with less capital? An empirical analysis providing a deﬁni-
tive answer is beyond our present scope, but we can brieﬂy
examine a few factors that may have operated in the past.
First, it is important to recognize that risk-
enhancing activities (such as commercial and industrial
lending and participation in derivatives markets) fre-
quently are also proﬁt-enhancing activities for bank hold-
ing companies of all sizes. Large companies may simply be
capable of pursuing these activities more aggressively
because they are equipped with the diversiﬁcation advan-
tage of size. Likewise, they may choose to operate with
lower capital ratios because of their diversiﬁcation advan-
tage. If small companies had that same advantage, they
might also choose to operate with lower capital ratios.13
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices and the consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly
traded bank holding companies.
Notes: Table presents the coefﬁcient on log of asset size from two regression mod-
els relating the log of systematic risk and the log of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk to the log of
size and a series of portfolio attribute control variables. Tables 1 and 2 describe
the portfolio variables in the model. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below
each of the coefﬁcient estimates.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK HOLDING COMPANY
SIZE AND RISK: WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS
FOR PORTFOLIO ATTRIBUTES
Percent Change in Risk following a














According to the conditional relationship, size
reduces ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk but, as expected, has
little effect on systematic risk.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 19
Second, economies of scale may make it cost-
effective for large bank holding companies to specialize in
riskier activities. For instance, derivatives dealers must
invest in costly resources, such as sophisticated computer
systems and skilled ﬁnancial engineers. These investments
may be worthwhile only for large-scale operations. Simi-
larly, large bank holding companies may have cost advan-
tages in terms of originating and holding commercial and
industrial loans.14 To the extent that there are economies of
scale in risk-enhancing activities, we would likely observe
large bank holding companies pursuing these activities
more aggressively than small companies, even if small
companies were as well diversiﬁed.
A ﬁnal factor that may explain differences in risk
taking by large and small bank holding companies is the
moral hazard problem associated with the too-big-to-fail
policy. Moral hazard occurs when deposit insurance or
some other form of guarantee reduces the incentives for
depositors and creditors to monitor and discipline bank
risk taking. Although moral hazard is a problem for all
depository institutions, the 1984 insolvency of Continental
Illinois set a precedent establishing that both insured and
uninsured deposits would be protected in the event of
insolvencies at very large institutions.15 If large depositors
are de facto insured, the monitoring and discipline of risk
taking at large institutions will be further reduced. A too-
big-to-fail policy may therefore result in greater risk tak-
ing at large bank holding companies than at small ones.16
We have seen that large bank holding companies
are better diversiﬁed than small ones but are no less risky.
The portfolios of the large companies, characterized by
greater leverage and riskier activities, offset the diversiﬁca-
tion advantage of size. However, there have been some very
interesting changes in the relationship between size and
risk since 1991, which we now explore.
RECENT CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SIZE AND RISK
A YEARLY ANALYSIS
To begin, we look at the evolution of the size/risk relation-
ship from 1987 to 1993. Table 4 reports measurements of
the strength of the relationships between size and system-
atic risk, size and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, and size and total
equity risk. Each column reveals some interesting differ-
ences between the pre-1992 and post-1992 periods.
Changes in the relationship between size and systematic
risk are most striking. The size/systematic risk relationship
is consistently positive from 1987 to 1991, but becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero in both 1992 and
1993. The relationship between size and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
also changes over time. Between 1987 and 1991, this rela-
tionship tends to be negative but is generally weak. In
1992 and 1993, the inverse relationship between size and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk strengthens and becomes statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
Post-1992 changes in the size/systematic risk and
size/ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk relationships lead to changes in the
size/total equity risk relationship. From 1987 to 1991,
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices and the consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly
traded bank holding companies.
Note: Table presents the Spearman (rank) correlation coefﬁcient between total
holding company assets and systematic risk, ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, and total equity
risk.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4











1987 129 0.38* -0.22* 0.10*
1988 119 0.26* -0.19* -0.04*
1989 111 0.33* -0.14* 0.01*
1990 105 0.42* -0.07* 0.20*
1991 98 0.27* -0.03* 0.12*
1992 89 0.12* -0.47* -0.21*
1993 80 0.17* -0.47* -0.14*
The portfolios of the large companies, character-
ized by greater leverage and riskier activities,
offset the diversiﬁcation advantage of size.20 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
large bank holding companies display signiﬁcantly greater
systematic risk than small companies but display less ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk (signiﬁcantly less in 1987). The two relation-
ships tend to balance, such that the relationship between
size and total equity risk over this period is either statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero or positive. In 1992 and
1993, however, large bank holding companies display sig-
niﬁcantly less ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk than small bank holding
companies, and they display similar systematic risk. As a
result, the relationship between size and total equity risk is
negative and, in 1992, signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Note that only after 1991 do the unconditional
size/risk relationships become consistent with the predic-
tions of portfolio theory: Large bank holding companies
display signiﬁcantly less ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk than small com-
panies but similar levels of systematic risk. As a result, we
observe an inverse relationship between size and total
equity risk. This contrasts with the generally insigniﬁcant
size/risk relationship observed before 1991.
Just how striking has the recent change in the
relationship between size and risk been? We answer this
question in Chart 3, which shows how total equity risk
varies with size for the 1987-91 and 1992-93 periods. For
this analysis, we also take account of a potential statistical
complication. In particular, if small bank holding compa-
nies are more likely to exit our original sample through
acquisition or failure, and if the stock returns of acquired
or failing companies are highly variable, then the evolution
of the size/risk relationship in the sample would be biased.
We avoid this potential source of bias by including only
those bank holding companies that remain in the sample
throughout the 1987-93 period.17 As in Table 4, we ﬁnd
that the diversiﬁcation advantage of size becomes apparent
after 1991. In contrast to the earlier period, the relation-
ship between size and total equity risk is negative, at least
for bank holding companies with assets up to $25 billion.
CHANGES IN THE PORTFOLIOS OF LARGE
AND SMALL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
We see for the ﬁrst time in 1992 and 1993 that the poten-
tial risk-reducing beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation are evident in
lower overall risk at large bank holding companies. What
has changed? One possibility is the riskiness of banking
activities. As we have seen, large and small bank holding
companies have traditionally held different portfolios, so a
reduction in the riskiness of activities in which large com-
panies dominate (or an increase in the riskiness of activities
in which small companies dominate) will reduce the risk of
large bank holding companies relative to that of small
ones.18 A second possibility is that banking activities have
themselves changed—that is, differences in the portfolio
composition of the typical large and the typical small bank
holding company may have diminished over time.
We can support this second hypothesis by compar-
ing the 1987 and 1993 portfolio characteristics for a typical
small and a typical large bank holding company (Table 5).
There are some striking differences between the values of
several of these characteristics. For our purposes, we will
We ﬁnd that the diversiﬁcation advantage of
size becomes apparent after 1991.
Relationship between Bank Holding Company Size￿
and Total Risk, 1987-91 and 1992-93
Chart 3
Percent
Less than $5 $5-$10 $10-$25 Greater than $25
(31 companies) (22 companies) (18 companies) (18 companies)
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Center for Research in￿
Security Prices and the consolidated financial statements of a sample of ￿








Average level of total risk:  1987-91
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focus on changes in those characteristics found to be most
important in explaining differences in risk at large and
small bank holding companies.
Trends in capital are very important in explaining
the decline in equity risk at large companies relative to
small ones. Although capital ratios of both small and large
bank holding companies increased between 1987 and
1993, the increase associated with the typical large com-
pany was much greater, thus closing substantially the gap
between the capital ratios of large and small bank holding
companies. (In 1987, the typical small bank holding com-
pany held 25 percent more capital per dollar of assets than
the typical large company. By 1993, the difference in the
capital ratios had fallen to only 3.5 percent.)
Changes in lending practices between 1987 and
1993 also contributed to declines in equity risk at large
bank holding companies relative to small ones. For
instance, the ratio of consumer loans to assets decreased at
the typical small company but increased at the typical
large company. The commercial and industrial loan ratio at
both small and large bank holding companies decreased,
slightly reducing the differential between the small com-
pany and large company ratios. Because commercial and
industrial lending tends to enhance risk and consumer
lending tends to decrease it, these patterns are consistent
with the observed decline in equity risk at large bank hold-
ing companies relative to small ones.19
THE ROLE OF REGULATORY CHANGES
What accounts for the shifts in holding company portfo-
lios? We certainly could point to the many changes in the
banking industry in recent years. From July 1990 to March
1991, the U.S. economy underwent a recession, accompa-
nied by a credit slowdown. But by 1992, improving loan
performance and changes in the level and slope of the yield
curve led to increased banking proﬁts. Overall, the rate of
bank failures in the 1990s has been very low, following a
decade in which the failure rate reached record high levels
Source: Consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly traded bank holding companies.
Notes: Table presents median portfolio attributes from 1987 and 1993 for two subsets from a sample of publicly traded bank holding companies. The ﬁrst column indicates
whether or not the portfolio attribute has a signiﬁcant impact on holding company risk. Columns 2 and 4 present median portfolio attributes for companies with less than
$5 billion in assets; the median size of the small bank holding companies is $3.6 billion in 1987 and $3.3 billion in 1993. Columns 3 and 5 present median portfolio
attributes for holding companies with more than $25 billion in assets; the median size of the large bank holding companies is $50 billion in 1987 and $51 billion in 1993.
a The loan concentration index equals the sum of the squared shares of each of the bank holding company’s loan types (commercial and industrial, real estate, agricultural,
consumer, and other) as a fraction of total loans. Higher values of the index indicate more concentrated lending.
b Interest rate swaps and foreign exchange futures are based on notional principal amounts.
c This variable equals 1 for holding companies with commercial bank subsidiaries operating in more than one census region and zero otherwise.
Table 5
HOW PORTFOLIO ATTRIBUTES OF LARGE AND SMALL BANK HOLDING COMPANIES DIFFER, 1987 AND 1993





















Commercial and industrial loans/assets Yes 18.74 23.70 12.23 16.80
Real estate loans/assets Yes 20.57 16.09 25.93 21.84
Agricultural loans/assets Yes 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.10
Consumer loans/assets 12.98 10.32 7.10 11.40
Loan concentration indexa Yes 29.36 28.89 36.91 30.01
Trading assets/assets 0.05 2.53 0.00 0.53
Deposits/assets 78.18 64.28 83.64 74.55
Noninterest deposits/assets 24.67 24.76 22.88 21.49
Foreign deposits/assets 0.04 21.21 0.00 4.40
Equity capital/assets Yes 6.43 5.15 7.30 7.05
Interest rate swaps/assetsb 0.00 19.20 0.00 28.51
Foreign exchange futures/assetsb Yes 0.00 28.72 0.00 4.30
Noninterest income/net interest income Yes 54.17 86.24 43.74 66.49
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not seen since the Depression (Edwards and Mishkin 1995).
Although these events are important in under-
standing the evolution of bank holding company risk,
widespread economic conditions would likely affect com-
panies of all sizes in a similar manner. Our results suggest
that something has changed the risk-taking behavior of
large banking companies relative to that of small banking
companies.
RISK-BASED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Recent changes in the U.S. regulatory climate provide one
possible explanation for changes in the behavior of large
banking companies relative to that of small ones. In 1988,
bank regulators established a set of international standards
designed to incorporate credit risk into each country’s capi-
tal adequacy rules, as well as to provide a “level playing
ﬁeld” for internationally active banking companies. In
response to these international standards, each of the U.S.
banking regulatory agencies amended its capital adequacy
standards to include new risk-based capital requirements.
The risk-based capital requirements, fully imple-
mented since 1992, permit banks and bank holding com-
panies engaged in relatively safe activities (such as home
mortgage lending) to operate with less capital than those
engaged in riskier activities. High-risk assets (such as com-
mercial and industrial loans) tend to reduce a company’s
risk-based capital ratio, while low-risk assets (such as gov-
ernment securities) tend to increase that ratio. Conse-
quently, a banking company can improve its risk-based
capital ratio either by increasing capital or by shifting its
portfolio from high-risk to low-risk assets. Moreover,
risk-based capital requirements take account of the credit
risk exposure associated with off-balance-sheet positions,
including derivatives. As part of the reform of capital stan-
dards, U.S. regulators now also require banking companies
to meet a minimum leverage ratio, deﬁned as total regula-
tory capital divided by average assets.20
Several empirical studies indicate that these regu-
latory requirements led to declines in bank lending in the
early 1990s. For instance, Laderman (1994) ﬁnds that
banks with deﬁciencies in “tier 1” capital reduced lending
sharply, in contrast to banks unconstrained by capital or
constrained only by their “tier 2” capital.21 Moreover, Peek
and Rosengren (1993) ﬁnd that loan growth was smaller at
banks facing formal regulatory actions.
If large bank holding companies were more likely
to be constrained by the new capital requirements, these
requirements may have had their greatest effect on the
portfolio choices of large companies. Table 6 uses data from
1991 to show that the tier 1 and total risk-based capital
ratios, as well as the leverage ratio, fell with holding com-
pany size.22 For instance, the tier 1 risk-based capital
ratio fell from 10.2 percent for the typical small holding
company to 6.6 percent for the typical large holding com-
pany. This pattern is not surprising given that large bank
holding companies were more active in commercial and
industrial lending and off-balance-sheet activities and
tended to hold less capital as a percentage of assets. It sug-
gests that risk-based capital requirements and leverage
ratio requirements may indeed have had a greater effect on
the recent behavior of large bank holding companies than
on the behavior of small ones.
Source: Consolidated ﬁnancial statements of a sample of publicly traded bank
holding companies.
Note: Table reports the median tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios and the
median leverage ratio for bank holding companies in each of four size categories
as of the end of 1991.
Table 6








Capital Ratio Leverage Ratio
Less than $5 billion 10.2 12.1 6.6
$5 to $10 billion 8.9 10.8 6.5
$10 to $25 billion 8.0 10.5 6.6
Greater than $25 billion 6.6 10.5 5.4
Recent changes in the U.S. regulatory climate
provide one possible explanation for changes in
the behavior of large banking companies relative
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Further reﬁnements in risk-based capital require-
ments may emerge in the near future as market risks asso-
ciated with banks’ trading activities are incorporated into
capital standards. Regulators from the U.S. banking agen-
cies are developing market risk capital standards with bank
regulators from other countries through the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision. Market risks, which
encompass risks associated with changes in interest rates,
foreign exchange rates, and equity prices, mainly affect
large banking companies heavily engaged in trading and
dealing in derivatives (such as interest rate and foreign
exchange swaps). Any new capital requirements related to
market risks will therefore most likely affect these large
banking companies more than small ones.
OTHER REGULATORY CHANGES
Additional changes in bank regulations have followed from
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, a broad-based
attempt to strengthen the deposit insurance funds (the Sav-
ings Association Insurance Fund and the Bank Insurance
Fund). The Prompt Corrective Action provision of FDICIA
attempts to reduce the cost of bank failure by enabling reg-
ulators to intervene early when banks face ﬁnancial difﬁcul-
ties. The act also attempts to reduce bank risk taking by
furthering the scope of risk-based capital requirements and
attempts to improve market discipline by discouraging a
too-big-to-fail policy.
Like risk-based capital requirements, FDICIA’s
least-cost resolution provision (which mandates that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation use the least-cost
method of resolving bank insolvencies) has presumably had
its greatest effect on large banking companies. If depositors
with accounts of more than $100,000 no longer believe
that their bank is too big to fail but instead believe that
they may face losses in the event of a failure, these deposi-
tors may bring additional market discipline to bear on
large banks. In particular, large depositors or other credi-
tors can penalize risky banks by requiring higher interest
payments for the use of their funds.
By strengthening capital standards, raising the
costs of holding a risky portfolio, and reducing the proba-
bility that a large banking company will be deemed too
big to fail, recent regulatory changes would seem to have
bitten hardest at large bank holding companies. Recent
changes in large companies’ portfolios, in particular
increased capital and decreased risky lending, suggest that
these regulatory changes have had a greater impact on the
risk-taking behavior of large companies than on that of
small companies. These new regulatory standards, how-
ever, have not been in place long enough to enable us to
fully substantiate their role in the evolution of the size/risk
relationship.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has explored the relationship between bank
holding company size and risk. We have shown that in the
past, size affected the mix between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and sys-
tematic risk but did not affect the level of total risk. Large
banking companies operated with greater leverage and
held riskier portfolios, offsetting the risk-reducing beneﬁts
normally associated with diversiﬁcation.
In recent years, however, the relationship between
size and risk has changed. The portfolios of large and small
holding companies have become increasingly similar. As a
result, the negative relationship between size and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk has strengthened substantially, while the posi-
tive relationship between size and systematic risk has
weakened. The diversiﬁcation advantage of size has become
evident in the lower total equity risk at large bank holding
companies.
Our analysis suggests that changes in the regula-
tory climate could explain changes in the relationship
between size and risk. New regulatory standards have not
been in place long enough to assess their full effect on this
relationship. Nevertheless, the evidence to date suggests
that these standards have prompted large bank holding
companies to reduce their overall risk to a level below that
of small bank holding companies.24 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING
SYSTEMATIC AND FIRM-SPECIFIC RISK
We deﬁne total equity risk as the variance of each bank
holding company’s weekly stock return over each year. In
order to deﬁne systematic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk for each
company, we estimate a return-generating model of the fol-
lowing form:
 ,
where t is an index for time, i is an index for each bank
holding company, k is an index for each of ﬁve systematic
factors (denoted f k), and Rt,i is the return for bank holding
company stock i during week t. The return-generating
model is estimated by a statistical procedure called factor
analysis. Using only information on the stock returns of
bank holding companies in our sample, factor analysis
solves for the factors (f 1
t,...,f 5
t) and the factor loadings
(b1
i,...,b5
i) that best explain the component of returns com-
mon to the -companies in our sample.
Intuitively, the f k are akin to economic variables
that generate changes in bank holding company stock
returns, such as changes in the level of the stock market,
changes in interest rates, and changes in the slope of the
yield curve. The statistical procedure, however, does not
require us to associate each factor with a particular source
of economic risk. That part of a given company’s stock
return unexplained by the ﬁve factors is captured in et,i.
This “residual return” is determined by inﬂuences unique
to each bank holding company.
We use this model to divide total risk (the vari-
ance of weekly stock returns) into systematic risk and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk. Systematic risk is deﬁned as that part of total
variance explained by the systematic factors (f k). The
Rt i , ai = bi
k ft




remainder of total variance is called ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. Our
procedure permits the following variance decomposition:
Total Risk=Systematic Risk+Firm-Speciﬁc Risk
. s
2










ei ( ) +
Notice that each bank holding company has a
unique set of bs, where bi
k measures company i’s exposure
to factor k. Bank holding companies heavily exposed to
systematic factors will have large bs (in absolute value) and
high levels of systematic risk. The ﬁrst term above is the
variability of company i’s stock generated by its exposure
to the ﬁve systematic factors. The stock returns of bank
holding companies with concentrations in particular
industries or regions will tend to be dominated by e, since
the fortunes of such companies will be tied to a particular
type of business or area of the country. The second term
above represents the variability in company i’s stock gener-
ated by the residual return.
One advantage of this approach is that because the
factors are determined using only data on bank holding
company returns, the measure of systematic risk will incor-
porate sources of risk speciﬁc to the banking industry, such
as changes in deposit insurance premia or changes in regu-
lations. However, the procedure may assign to systematic
risk certain risks normally considered diversiﬁable. For
instance, if most of the bank holding companies in our
sample have a common risk, such as lending to a particular
sector of the economy, then a bank holding company with a
high exposure to that sector will exhibit a high level of sys-
tematic risk.ENDNOTES
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1. A bank holding company is a company that owns or controls one or
more banks. It may also own nonbank subsidiaries.
2. Of course, it is possible that large bank holding companies simply
make larger loans rather than a greater number of loans to a wider variety
of borrowers. In this case, there may be little or no diversification
advantage of size.
3. There are several ways to carry out the risk decomposition. Our
approach compares the stock returns of each bank holding company to
the returns of a large sample of bank holding companies. Alternatively,
the stock returns of each bank holding company could be compared with
other variables measuring economic conditions, such as a stock market
index or the level of interest rates. In Demsetz and Strahan (1995), we use
three alternative approaches when decomposing total equity risk into its
two components. As a check on the robustness of our methodology, we
show that the size/risk relationships are similar in all three cases.
4. That is, risk is predominately related to some aspect of this particular
bank holding company, perhaps a large concentration of loans to
borrowers in a regional industry such as mining or agriculture.
5. We initially identified approximately 150 publicly traded bank
holding companies by referring to the Bank Compustat database. We
tracked these companies’ stock returns and characteristics in each year
between 1987 and 1993. Our analysis is based on those bank holding
companies for which we could retrieve both stock return data and data
describing bank holding company characteristics, and whose stock
traded for at least thirty weeks in a given calendar year. There is some
year-to-year variability in our sample size because several bank holding
companies did not have traded stock in every year between 1987 and
1993. In the case of mergers, we dropped acquired companies from the
sample after the date of acquisition. Acquirers remain in the sample.
6. Relationships derived using the pooled 1987-93 data are
representative of those derived using annual data, with the exception of
1992 and 1993. Changes in the size/risk relationship in these years are
discussed in the “Recent Changes” section. Our analysis focuses on the
1987-93 period because 1987 was the first year in which data describing
certain bank holding company characteristics were available.
7. Other authors (Boyd and Gertler 1993 and Samolyk 1994) have also
found that large banks held riskier portfolios than small banks during the
1980s and early 1990s.
8. Boyd and Runkle (1993) also find that large banks hold less capital
than small banks.
9. Figures reported in Table 2 are based on those reported in Table 1 and
coefficients from regressions with the log of firm-specific and the log of
systematic risk as dependent variables and a number of bank holding
company characteristics (including asset size) as independent variables.
In particular, coefficients from a regression based on data from 1987 to
1993 are multiplied by differences in the characteristics of large and
small bank holding companies in 1987 to derive figures reported in
Table 2.
10. Levonian (1994) shows that bank accounting profits exhibit low
correlation across states, suggesting that bank holding companies
operating in many states may be able to reduce risk through diversification.
11. Each regression also includes an independent variable measuring the
liquidity of each bank holding company’s stock.
12. Although they do not focus on the role of size, Liang and Rhoades
(1991) do find that the effects of diversification depend on banks’
portfolio choices. Using balance-sheet data, they show that the risk-
reducing benefits of diversification are partially offset by a positive
relationship between diversification and leverage.
13. Large bank holding companies may also choose to operate with lower
capital ratios because they have better access to funds through the capital
markets. If large bank holding companies can raise new capital more
quickly and more cheaply, they may have less need for a large capital
cushion.
14. In addition, Diamond (1984) shows that diversification can actually
reduce the cost of monitoring risky loans; hence, it may be efficient for
risky lending to be concentrated in the hands of large, well-diversified
bank holding companies.
15. On September 19, 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency testified
before Congress that some banks were “too big to fail.” For these banks,
which were not explicitly named, all depositors would be insured.
O'Hara and Shaw (1990) note that the Wall Street Journal named the
eleven largest banks in reporting the story (on September 20) and go on
to show that the stock returns on these eleven banks rose in response to
the announcement of the too-big-to-fail policy.
16. Of course, large bank holding companies are likely to have
established longstanding relationships with both borrowers and
depositors. The desire to protect these relationships and the profits they
generate may counterbalance the incentive problems inherent in the too-
big-to-fail policy. As a result, the incentives for risk taking at the expense
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are likely to be strong only
at weakly capitalized institutions.26 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 NOTES
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17. The use of this “balanced panel” prevents us from generalizing our
findings to all bank holding companies. We note, however, that the
attrition rate was about the same for each of the first three size categories
(about one-third) and only slightly smaller for the largest size category
(about one-fifth), so the size distribution of the surviving bank holding
companies is fairly representative of the overall size distribution.
18. This hypothesis, however, is difficult to test since the riskiness of the
assets underlying bank holding company portfolios is not directly
observable.
19. Recall that these figures are based on our sample of publicly traded
bank holding companies and may not be fully representative of the entire
population of bank holding companies.
20. This standard was added to the risk-based capital requirements because
a bank could, in theory, hold no capital under these requirements if it held
only very safe assets, such as government securities. See Spong (1994) for
more detail on risk-based capital requirements and other recent regulatory
changes.
21. Tier 1 capital includes those types of capital that provide the best
protection against loss. The components of tier 2 capital can still protect
against loss but are considered lower quality protection. See Spong
(1994) for information on the components of tier 1 and tier 2 capital.
22. We focus on 1991 capital ratios because we are interested in changes
in bank holding company behavior in 1992 and 1993. The tier 1 and
total risk-based capital ratios are defined as tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets and total capital divided by risk-weighted assets,
respectively. The leverage ratio is defined as total capital divided by
average assets.
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